Wednesday, July 11, 2007
Monday, July 09, 2007
The Big Story That Isn’t
One of the biggest stories in recent times is due shortly to hit the British media.
This follows the unprecedented decision of Mohammad Sarwar, Labour MP for Glasgow Govan since 1997, to stand down before the next elections, following threats upon both his and his children’s lives.The press are in frenzy because there are so many aspects to this story deemed irresistible to the media-driven modern Britain in which we are so fortunate to live today.
Mr. Sarwar has the dubious honour of being both Britain’s first Muslim MP, and Britain’s first MP to be driven from office upon threat of death.
When he was elected, to a fanfare of media coverage, Mr. Sarwar managed yet another first; he refused to swear allegiance to the Queen, preferring instead the ancient British tradition of swearing his oath upon the Koran — the copy of which, incidentally, was placed inside an envelope lest it “be touched by one not of the faith.”
This, unsurprisingly, drew the ire of the racist Right and Mr. Sarwar was subsequently threatened by an assortment of organisations, including Combat 18 and the National Front.
This of course is manna from heaven for the British media.
The BBC have led the way, camping outside Mr. Sarwar’s constituency home, interviewing local Pakistanis who feel “threatened and uncomfortable” and conducting an undercover infiltration of the BNP in order to track down the perpetrators behind the violent threats that have forced a standing British MP to go into hiding for the first time in our modern history.
If you possess a powerful telescope, and train it carefully upon Glasgow, you may well be able to view the events unfolding. Be sure though, to point it at Glasgow, Planet Fantasy, Milky Way 1.
If you do not, you will see very little, because this story exists only in the Britain of a parallel universe. Back here on planet reality it is a non-story, indeed almost a non-event. A by-line here, a by-line there, but virtually unreported on television news stations.
The reason for this media blackout is very simple. It is not the National Front, Combat 18 or the BNP who have issued the recent death threats, it is local Muslims themselves, incensed by what they see as his treacherous behaviour in relation to the murder of Kriss Donald, a white Glaswegian, in 2004.Those of you familiar with the case, or those of a sensitive disposition, need not read the next paragraph. I note the details only because they have a relevance which I will come to later.Kriss Donald, a slightly built, 15-year-old schoolboy was abducted from the streets of Pollockshields, Glasgow, on March 14, 2004. His kidnappers were five British Muslims of Pakistani descent, intent on exacting retribution on a white male — any white male would do — following a fight in a night club the previous weekend. Kriss was driven around for several hours whilst he was held down and tortured in the back of the car. He was eventually taken to an area of waste ground where he was finished off. Before he died, it is alleged that he was castrated, burned with cigarettes; his eyes were gouged out and he was stabbed repeatedly. Once on the waste ground he was doused with gasoline and set alight whilst still alive. He crawled a few metres and then, mercifully, died. A walker who discovered his body the following morning was unaware that it was even human, remarking, that at first, he thought it was the carcass of an animal.- - - - - - - - - -Two men were subsequently arrested, but the other three, aware the police knew their identities, fled to Pakistan. The Foreign Office at that time was involved in delicate negotiations with Pakistan over the extradition rights concerning full-blown terrorists, so an unimportant little murder such as Kriss Donald’s was simply a fly in the ointment they did not need. As a result, they did their best to frustrate attempts by the British police to retrieve their suspects.Enter Mr.
Mohammad Sarwar, a man with a clearer sense of right and wrong, and a political position with which to do something about it. Mr. Sarwar was instrumental in forcing the British government to press ahead with the extradition of the three men, and thus, in the eyes of some British Muslims, committed a crime of such magnitude that only his death could adequately compensate for his treachery.I apologise for detailing the gory details of Kriss Donald’s torture and murder, but its relevance is shown in the following quotes from Mr. Sarwar, printed in the Daily Telegraph:
“Life is not the same since I brought them back… I received threats to my life, to murder my sons, to murder my grandchildren…I was told they wanted to punish my family and make a horrible example of my son… they would do to him what they did to Kriss Donald.”There were other firsts in the story that should have interested the media. Daamish Zahid, one of the five killers, was the first person in Scotland to be convicted of racially motivated murder, whilst the sheer brutality of the murder itself was unprecedented in Britain. (An issue all too predictably rectified a year later by six black British men who gang raped, tortured and murdered Mary Ann Leneghan.)But I digress.To recap, Britain’s first Muslim MP is also Britain’s first ever politician to stand down in the face of death threats; threats uttered by followers of the Religion of Peace who sympathise with the Islamic savages involved in the most horrific racial murder in Britain’s recent history, one of whom, to boot, was also the first “Scotsman” to be convicted of racially aggravated murder.Now, correct me if I’m wrong, but surely there’s a story in there somewhere? I know it is now a tired old cliché, but imagine if Mr. Paul Boateng, Britain’s first black MP, had been driven from office by a bunch of white, right wing Christian fundamentalists, enraged that he had succeeded in bringing the white killers of the black Stephen Lawrence to justice?A foolish hypothesis, I admit. One could discard the telescope, whilst an investment in blinkers and earmuffs would be necessary to avoid the media hysteria. We are used to the double standards utilised by the media with regard to racial murder, but this time it is different. This is not any old murder, not any old death threats, and Mr. Sarwar is not any old person.When Britain, a First World country, loses a democratically-elected politician because he fears for his life, we are entering a wholly new era. Britain is now an Iraq, a Zimbabwe.We are becoming, in political terms, a genuine Third World country, and our BBC-led media, showing a total disregard for impartiality, has veered from mere bias to dangerous censorship, with all the disturbing implications this portends for our democratic future.Many political commentators believe that Britain is dead, Lawrence Auster in particular, but Mr. Auster also thinks it can be resurrected. If this is to happen it must happen soon.Our national heart has ceased to beat. Our national soul is hovering indecisively above the operating table. The crash team have been called, but the politically inclined hospital switchboard have told them there is no problem, that everything is under control.The life support boys have heard otherwise, they are hurrying to get there, but other hospital staff members have switched the signage to the operating theatre and killed the lights. It is a big hospital, they only have minutes to get there, they are lost, confused, misinformed, and the clock is relentlessly ticking, and ticking, and ticking…
“Life is not the same since I brought them back… I received threats to my life, to murder my sons, to murder my grandchildren…I was told they wanted to punish my family and make a horrible example of my son… they would do to him what they did to Kriss Donald.”There were other firsts in the story that should have interested the media. Daamish Zahid, one of the five killers, was the first person in Scotland to be convicted of racially motivated murder, whilst the sheer brutality of the murder itself was unprecedented in Britain. (An issue all too predictably rectified a year later by six black British men who gang raped, tortured and murdered Mary Ann Leneghan.)But I digress.To recap, Britain’s first Muslim MP is also Britain’s first ever politician to stand down in the face of death threats; threats uttered by followers of the Religion of Peace who sympathise with the Islamic savages involved in the most horrific racial murder in Britain’s recent history, one of whom, to boot, was also the first “Scotsman” to be convicted of racially aggravated murder.Now, correct me if I’m wrong, but surely there’s a story in there somewhere? I know it is now a tired old cliché, but imagine if Mr. Paul Boateng, Britain’s first black MP, had been driven from office by a bunch of white, right wing Christian fundamentalists, enraged that he had succeeded in bringing the white killers of the black Stephen Lawrence to justice?A foolish hypothesis, I admit. One could discard the telescope, whilst an investment in blinkers and earmuffs would be necessary to avoid the media hysteria. We are used to the double standards utilised by the media with regard to racial murder, but this time it is different. This is not any old murder, not any old death threats, and Mr. Sarwar is not any old person.When Britain, a First World country, loses a democratically-elected politician because he fears for his life, we are entering a wholly new era. Britain is now an Iraq, a Zimbabwe.We are becoming, in political terms, a genuine Third World country, and our BBC-led media, showing a total disregard for impartiality, has veered from mere bias to dangerous censorship, with all the disturbing implications this portends for our democratic future.Many political commentators believe that Britain is dead, Lawrence Auster in particular, but Mr. Auster also thinks it can be resurrected. If this is to happen it must happen soon.Our national heart has ceased to beat. Our national soul is hovering indecisively above the operating table. The crash team have been called, but the politically inclined hospital switchboard have told them there is no problem, that everything is under control.The life support boys have heard otherwise, they are hurrying to get there, but other hospital staff members have switched the signage to the operating theatre and killed the lights. It is a big hospital, they only have minutes to get there, they are lost, confused, misinformed, and the clock is relentlessly ticking, and ticking, and ticking…
©2007 Paul Weston
The Columbus Dispatch Mutilates a LA Times Jerusalem Feature
How do you fit a feature article of more than 4,500 words into a space of less than 2,000 words?
The Columbus Dispatch’s June 10, 2007 publication of “Who owns Jerusalem?”,
a drastically shortened version of a June 3 feature by the Los Angeles Times, “A holy city still divided,” is a prime example of what not to do.
The original Times piece, by Jerusalem correspondents Ken Ellingwood and Richard Boudreaux had its own faults, but its shortcomings paled in comparison to the Dispatch’s hackneyed rendering of the relatively balanced original work.
The Columbus editors expunged humanizing Israeli accounts but preserved those concerning Arabs while deleting references to Arab responsibility for the ongoing de facto divisions of the holy city.
Period of Coexistence Ignored
The Columbus Dispatch glosses over the period of coexistence and mingling following the city’s reunification, which came to an end due to Arab violence in the late 1980s. In the Times version, an Israeli woman, Madlene Vanunu, discussed this point in a first-person account. Her humanizing testimony, excised by the Dispatch, follows:
Madlene Vanunu spent her youth on Israel’s side of the barbed wire that once carved Jerusalem into Israeli and Jordanian halves.
“We used to see the Arabs through the fence. Sometimes we would talk. Sometimes they said, ‘Good morning.’ Other times they threw stones,” said Vanunu, who is 58 and still lives in the same house in the working-class Musrara neighborhood.
When the fence came down, it was just a five-minute walk to the spice-scented lanes of the Old City.
“In the years after the war, we went to the Old City every Saturday,” said Vanunu, who works in the municipal art gallery in West Jerusalem. “We would go to restaurants, meet with people and talk.”
But in the 20 years since the first Palestinian intifada, she has been there only once, and then with fear. The six years of on-and-off clashes that began in 1987 drove the two sides apart. The [Arab] violence became a turning point in their relations.
No mention of Vanunu appears in the Dispatch report. All that is retained from this section of the Times report is:
Today secular Jews rarely venture into East Jerusalem’s traffic-choked downtown near the Old City. Observant Jews still walk through the Old City’s Muslim quarter on their way to worship and study, but they have been assaulted.
Israeli Couple Cut
Hillel and Shlomit Mali, a young couple who moved into the Arab populated Mount of Olives section of Jerusalem, get the same treatment as Vanunu. They, like Vanunu, exhibited neighborly coexistence, which was met by Arab hostility. But the Dispatch chose to delete Ellingwood and Boudreaux’s humanizing story about them, reporting only that the “arrival of the Jewish families set off riots, followed by an icy coexistence and made the red-roofed apartment house on Mansouriyeh Street a microcosm of the struggle of Jerusalem.” Here is what did not make the cut:
Hillel and Shlomit Mali could hardly have picked a less welcoming place to settle as newlyweds. They arrived three months after the first Jews moved into the building. Their new home was directly upstairs from Mahmoud, his wife, mother and four children.
Unlike Elad’s instrusive security agents, Hillel, a 24-year-old musician, and Shlomit, a 23-year-old graduate student of literature, were solicitous and polite. Though it is assertive in acquiring property, Elad says it tries to minimize backlash by choosing settlers who are not confrontational.
Soon after the couple moved in, Hillel phoned downstairs to introduce himself in rudimentary Arabic. Mahmoud hung up and still won’t speak to the couple.
The Malis sent sweets on the Jewish holiday of Purim. Mahmoud’s mother, Fatima, tossed them into the garbage.
Saturday mornings, when the Jews pray in their top-floor synagogue, the Abu Hawas tune in a radio broadcast of Muslim prayers and turn up the volume. Neighborhood children stone the Jewish apartments and smash the cameras installed by 24-hour armed guards who watch the building from a control room just off the stairwell.
“They try to be nice,” Fatima said. “But they were the reason my son was killed. [See below.] They took my house. How can I accept them? I want to make their lives miserable so that they will leave.”
Yet they remain. Forty years after the war, Hillel and Shlomit embody the unfulfilled aspiration of a united Jerusalem under Jewish control.
“I try to talk with my neighbors,” said Hillel, taking in a spectacular view of the contested holy sites from his roof. “Sometimes this is a very hard mission. But if I don’t do this, if I leave the Mount of Olives, I fail.”
Mahmoud would consider the battle won.
“The Israelis say to me, ‘Shalom,’ but I never say anything back because, honestly, there can be no relationship with these people, no peace. They fight you with their weapons, with their money, with everything.
“They’re trying to take over this whole area, all these houses, and kick us out. We say, ‘No way.’”
One Israeli Account Retained
There is, however, one Israeli whose personal story the Dispatch considers worth retaining: that of Moshe Amirav, one of the paratroopers who captured eastern Jerusalem from Jordanian troops in 1967. Amirav’s present-day stance is highly critical of Israel’s presence in the eastern part of the Jerusalem, and his message conforms with the Dispatch’s simplistic narrative that Israeli policies are to be blamed for a reunification in name only. The Dispatch recounts:
By annexing East Jerusalem, an exuberant Israel bit off too much, said Amirav, now head of the public policy department at Beir Berl College.
“The notion of a united city does not exist anymore,” he said.
Lengthy Palestinian Stories Preserved
In contrast to the total deletion of any reference to the humanizing stories about Israelis Vanunu and the Malis, the humanizing testimonies of three Palestinian families are largely preserved in the Dispatch version. No Palestinians are erased like Madlene, Hillel and Shlomit.
Indeed, the detailed story about the aforementioned abu Hawa family, the unreceptive Arab neighbors of Hillel and Shlomit Mali, is mostly retained. It begins dramatically:
At 2 o’clock one morning last spring, Mahmoud abu Hawa awoke in his house on the Mount of Olives to the sound of banging on the door.
He was horrified to learn that his new neighbors were Jews.
They arrived escorted by dozens of armed security agents, he recalls. Even though it was the middle of the night, men from Elad, a Jewish settlers group, rousted the 44-year-old Palestinian tour-bus driver from his sleep and insisted on talking to him. Abu Hawa watched in disbelief as they opened a suitcase on his children’s bed. It contained about $300,000 in cash.
The story continues in this vein, including:
Working through a Jordan-based company, Elad signed a deal to pay Mahmoud abu Hawa and two of his brothers $900,000 for their building. Mahmoud said they thought they were selling to Arabs, but he became suspicious and backed out; his brothers Khalil and Mohammed took the money.
Two weeks later, Mohammed was found dead in the West Bank city of Jericho, shot eight times at close range.
Other than excluding any mention of the “solicitous and polite” Malis, what else does the Dispatch leave out about the abu Hawas? How about who, exactly, shot Mohammed, and why? The Times reports, but the Dispatch doesn’t:
The Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, a Palestinian militant group, claimed responsibility. Mahmoud thinks his brother, who left six children, may have been killed not for selling but for trying to expose the Arab middlemen who deceived him. [CAMERA notes: Mahmoud’s supposed theory is nonsensical. Why would the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade object to the exposure of deceptive Arab middlemen? The Brigades opposes the sale of Arab property to Jews.]
In addition, the family-owned restaurant has been burned since the sale and Mahmoud has suffered a heart attack.
Surely, intimidation and even murder on the part of a Palestinian terror group is a significant factor to weigh in light of Mahmoud’s words: “Nobody in this neighborhood will sell voluntarily to Israeli Jews. Never.”
Another important piece of deleted information undercuts the storyline of Jewish trespassing on Arab terrain:
Elad’s founder, David Beeri, discovered in the 1980s that some Holy Basin properties had been purchased by Jews before the 1948 war and that the deeds were being held by the Jewish National Fund, a major custodian of land in Israel. [The Mount of Olives where the abu Hawas and the Malis live is in the Holy Basin.]
In addition to the personal story of the abu Hawa family, the Dispatch preserves most of an extensive account of Kamil and Suad Saou and their demolished home in eastern Jerusalem. This section constitutes a significant portion of the entire feature. Readers get details about the Saou’s crushed olive, almond, apricot and lemon seedlings; their children returning from school to a pile of rubble, and the view from their kitchen window.
What did the Dispatch cut out from the Saou saga? Omitted are crucial details that undercut the picture of an unreasonable, brutish Israel victimizing hapless Palestinians, such as the fact that in the face of Palestinian appeals, the municipality backed down from demolishing 27 homes without permits; that “the family missed a deadline for renewing its permit application,” and:
According to Meir Margalit, a former Jerusalem city councilman who opposes demolitions, Palestinians have constructed more than 1,000 homes a year in East Jerusalem in this decade, more than 90% of them without permits. The most torn down in a single year was 152.
Palestinians have fended off the bulldozers with Israeli help.
Israeli courts routinely delay demolition orders. The Israeli press has given sympathetic coverage to Palestinian protests, such as a peaceful sit-in two years ago that forced the city to call off plans to destroy 88 homes in one neighborhood. Many Israelis oppose the demolitions on humanitarian grounds or object to the diversion of large number of police to protect the wrecking crews. . .
“You have anarchic growth in East Jerusalem,” [said lawyer Daniel Seidemann].
Similarly, the story of Palestinian builder Ibrahim Dakkak, who in 1967 “huddled with his family under their kitchen table and listened to the sound of combat” is kept intact in the Dispatch version. His humanizing personal account includes the details:
Fearful of being discovered by Israeli troops, Dakkak’s wife muffled the cries of their year-old son by cramming a tomato into his mouth. . . .
“I felt defeated,” said Dakkak, now 78.
Arab Responsibility Deleted
The Dispatch cuts out critical background information which points to an Arab role for the divided nature of the city.
Israel offered citizenship to Palestinians in East Jerusalem after the war, but few accepted. The rest were given the status of Jerusalem residents who can work in Israel and must pay Israeli taxes. They also can run and vote in municipal elections, and their numbers would give them significant clout. But they have largely boycotted city politics. [CAMERA notes: In other words, if they exercised their right for representation, they would have a more significant say in the matters that concern them, such as funding and services. The demographically similar ultra-Orthodox population, much of which also does not recognize the idea of a sovereign Jewish state, nevertheless acknowledges the pragmatic advantage to be had by participating in local politics, and therefore enjoys the benefits.]
“If we accept to have elections in East Jerusalem under the umbrella of Israeli law, it means that we recognize the legitimacy of the annexation,” said Ziad Abu Zayyad, a former Palestinian Cabinet minister who edits a journal on Israeli-Palestinian affairs.
In the 1990s, interim peace accords enshrined Palestinian demands that residents of Jerusalem be allowed to vote and run in elections for the Palestinian Authority. That helped reinforce a non-Israeli identity.
“We failed to bring the Arabs to the idea that they are part of Jerusalem,” said Rivlin, the lawmaker. “And when we let them vote for the Palestinians election, we let them declare that they are not part of Israel.”
The severe violence of the second intifada, which erupted in 2000, made the chasm seem unbridgeable.
Vanunu said she favored a more conciliatory line toward Arabs, but she wondered when she would feel comfortable strolling in the Old City again. Last time, on the Yom Kippur holiday four years ago, “I went trembling,” she said.
“These days, I hear more and more voices saying they don’t want us here, that they want to throw us into the sea, she said. “It is when I stop hearing these voices that I may go to East Jerusalem again.”
This passage highlights the Arab refusal to take part in their own municipal government, compounded with Arab violence against and hostility towards Jews, both significant factors contributing to the city’s de facto division.
Conclusion
To be sure, passages and sentences from the original Los Angeles Times feature that reinforce the Arab notion Israel is a brutal occupier of the oppressed Arab residents are also deleted. Nevertheless, that view, as expressed by Ibrahim Dabbak, Kamil and Suad Saou, Moaz Zatari, Mahmoud and Fatima abu Hawa, and aided by Moshe Amirav, is the overwhelming narrative of the Dispatch’s version.
As Dabbak observes about Israel’s victory in 1967, “We were talking two completely different languages. They were thinking they were liberating the land, and we were thinking they were occupying the land.”
In the Dispatch’s lopsided editing of the Times story, only one side was allowed to do the talking. The other, represented by Madlene Vanunu and Hillel and Shlomit Mali, was completely muted.
by Tamar Sternthal
The Columbus Dispatch’s June 10, 2007 publication of “Who owns Jerusalem?”,
a drastically shortened version of a June 3 feature by the Los Angeles Times, “A holy city still divided,” is a prime example of what not to do.
The original Times piece, by Jerusalem correspondents Ken Ellingwood and Richard Boudreaux had its own faults, but its shortcomings paled in comparison to the Dispatch’s hackneyed rendering of the relatively balanced original work.
The Columbus editors expunged humanizing Israeli accounts but preserved those concerning Arabs while deleting references to Arab responsibility for the ongoing de facto divisions of the holy city.
Period of Coexistence Ignored
The Columbus Dispatch glosses over the period of coexistence and mingling following the city’s reunification, which came to an end due to Arab violence in the late 1980s. In the Times version, an Israeli woman, Madlene Vanunu, discussed this point in a first-person account. Her humanizing testimony, excised by the Dispatch, follows:
Madlene Vanunu spent her youth on Israel’s side of the barbed wire that once carved Jerusalem into Israeli and Jordanian halves.
“We used to see the Arabs through the fence. Sometimes we would talk. Sometimes they said, ‘Good morning.’ Other times they threw stones,” said Vanunu, who is 58 and still lives in the same house in the working-class Musrara neighborhood.
When the fence came down, it was just a five-minute walk to the spice-scented lanes of the Old City.
“In the years after the war, we went to the Old City every Saturday,” said Vanunu, who works in the municipal art gallery in West Jerusalem. “We would go to restaurants, meet with people and talk.”
But in the 20 years since the first Palestinian intifada, she has been there only once, and then with fear. The six years of on-and-off clashes that began in 1987 drove the two sides apart. The [Arab] violence became a turning point in their relations.
No mention of Vanunu appears in the Dispatch report. All that is retained from this section of the Times report is:
Today secular Jews rarely venture into East Jerusalem’s traffic-choked downtown near the Old City. Observant Jews still walk through the Old City’s Muslim quarter on their way to worship and study, but they have been assaulted.
Israeli Couple Cut
Hillel and Shlomit Mali, a young couple who moved into the Arab populated Mount of Olives section of Jerusalem, get the same treatment as Vanunu. They, like Vanunu, exhibited neighborly coexistence, which was met by Arab hostility. But the Dispatch chose to delete Ellingwood and Boudreaux’s humanizing story about them, reporting only that the “arrival of the Jewish families set off riots, followed by an icy coexistence and made the red-roofed apartment house on Mansouriyeh Street a microcosm of the struggle of Jerusalem.” Here is what did not make the cut:
Hillel and Shlomit Mali could hardly have picked a less welcoming place to settle as newlyweds. They arrived three months after the first Jews moved into the building. Their new home was directly upstairs from Mahmoud, his wife, mother and four children.
Unlike Elad’s instrusive security agents, Hillel, a 24-year-old musician, and Shlomit, a 23-year-old graduate student of literature, were solicitous and polite. Though it is assertive in acquiring property, Elad says it tries to minimize backlash by choosing settlers who are not confrontational.
Soon after the couple moved in, Hillel phoned downstairs to introduce himself in rudimentary Arabic. Mahmoud hung up and still won’t speak to the couple.
The Malis sent sweets on the Jewish holiday of Purim. Mahmoud’s mother, Fatima, tossed them into the garbage.
Saturday mornings, when the Jews pray in their top-floor synagogue, the Abu Hawas tune in a radio broadcast of Muslim prayers and turn up the volume. Neighborhood children stone the Jewish apartments and smash the cameras installed by 24-hour armed guards who watch the building from a control room just off the stairwell.
“They try to be nice,” Fatima said. “But they were the reason my son was killed. [See below.] They took my house. How can I accept them? I want to make their lives miserable so that they will leave.”
Yet they remain. Forty years after the war, Hillel and Shlomit embody the unfulfilled aspiration of a united Jerusalem under Jewish control.
“I try to talk with my neighbors,” said Hillel, taking in a spectacular view of the contested holy sites from his roof. “Sometimes this is a very hard mission. But if I don’t do this, if I leave the Mount of Olives, I fail.”
Mahmoud would consider the battle won.
“The Israelis say to me, ‘Shalom,’ but I never say anything back because, honestly, there can be no relationship with these people, no peace. They fight you with their weapons, with their money, with everything.
“They’re trying to take over this whole area, all these houses, and kick us out. We say, ‘No way.’”
One Israeli Account Retained
There is, however, one Israeli whose personal story the Dispatch considers worth retaining: that of Moshe Amirav, one of the paratroopers who captured eastern Jerusalem from Jordanian troops in 1967. Amirav’s present-day stance is highly critical of Israel’s presence in the eastern part of the Jerusalem, and his message conforms with the Dispatch’s simplistic narrative that Israeli policies are to be blamed for a reunification in name only. The Dispatch recounts:
By annexing East Jerusalem, an exuberant Israel bit off too much, said Amirav, now head of the public policy department at Beir Berl College.
“The notion of a united city does not exist anymore,” he said.
Lengthy Palestinian Stories Preserved
In contrast to the total deletion of any reference to the humanizing stories about Israelis Vanunu and the Malis, the humanizing testimonies of three Palestinian families are largely preserved in the Dispatch version. No Palestinians are erased like Madlene, Hillel and Shlomit.
Indeed, the detailed story about the aforementioned abu Hawa family, the unreceptive Arab neighbors of Hillel and Shlomit Mali, is mostly retained. It begins dramatically:
At 2 o’clock one morning last spring, Mahmoud abu Hawa awoke in his house on the Mount of Olives to the sound of banging on the door.
He was horrified to learn that his new neighbors were Jews.
They arrived escorted by dozens of armed security agents, he recalls. Even though it was the middle of the night, men from Elad, a Jewish settlers group, rousted the 44-year-old Palestinian tour-bus driver from his sleep and insisted on talking to him. Abu Hawa watched in disbelief as they opened a suitcase on his children’s bed. It contained about $300,000 in cash.
The story continues in this vein, including:
Working through a Jordan-based company, Elad signed a deal to pay Mahmoud abu Hawa and two of his brothers $900,000 for their building. Mahmoud said they thought they were selling to Arabs, but he became suspicious and backed out; his brothers Khalil and Mohammed took the money.
Two weeks later, Mohammed was found dead in the West Bank city of Jericho, shot eight times at close range.
Other than excluding any mention of the “solicitous and polite” Malis, what else does the Dispatch leave out about the abu Hawas? How about who, exactly, shot Mohammed, and why? The Times reports, but the Dispatch doesn’t:
The Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, a Palestinian militant group, claimed responsibility. Mahmoud thinks his brother, who left six children, may have been killed not for selling but for trying to expose the Arab middlemen who deceived him. [CAMERA notes: Mahmoud’s supposed theory is nonsensical. Why would the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade object to the exposure of deceptive Arab middlemen? The Brigades opposes the sale of Arab property to Jews.]
In addition, the family-owned restaurant has been burned since the sale and Mahmoud has suffered a heart attack.
Surely, intimidation and even murder on the part of a Palestinian terror group is a significant factor to weigh in light of Mahmoud’s words: “Nobody in this neighborhood will sell voluntarily to Israeli Jews. Never.”
Another important piece of deleted information undercuts the storyline of Jewish trespassing on Arab terrain:
Elad’s founder, David Beeri, discovered in the 1980s that some Holy Basin properties had been purchased by Jews before the 1948 war and that the deeds were being held by the Jewish National Fund, a major custodian of land in Israel. [The Mount of Olives where the abu Hawas and the Malis live is in the Holy Basin.]
In addition to the personal story of the abu Hawa family, the Dispatch preserves most of an extensive account of Kamil and Suad Saou and their demolished home in eastern Jerusalem. This section constitutes a significant portion of the entire feature. Readers get details about the Saou’s crushed olive, almond, apricot and lemon seedlings; their children returning from school to a pile of rubble, and the view from their kitchen window.
What did the Dispatch cut out from the Saou saga? Omitted are crucial details that undercut the picture of an unreasonable, brutish Israel victimizing hapless Palestinians, such as the fact that in the face of Palestinian appeals, the municipality backed down from demolishing 27 homes without permits; that “the family missed a deadline for renewing its permit application,” and:
According to Meir Margalit, a former Jerusalem city councilman who opposes demolitions, Palestinians have constructed more than 1,000 homes a year in East Jerusalem in this decade, more than 90% of them without permits. The most torn down in a single year was 152.
Palestinians have fended off the bulldozers with Israeli help.
Israeli courts routinely delay demolition orders. The Israeli press has given sympathetic coverage to Palestinian protests, such as a peaceful sit-in two years ago that forced the city to call off plans to destroy 88 homes in one neighborhood. Many Israelis oppose the demolitions on humanitarian grounds or object to the diversion of large number of police to protect the wrecking crews. . .
“You have anarchic growth in East Jerusalem,” [said lawyer Daniel Seidemann].
Similarly, the story of Palestinian builder Ibrahim Dakkak, who in 1967 “huddled with his family under their kitchen table and listened to the sound of combat” is kept intact in the Dispatch version. His humanizing personal account includes the details:
Fearful of being discovered by Israeli troops, Dakkak’s wife muffled the cries of their year-old son by cramming a tomato into his mouth. . . .
“I felt defeated,” said Dakkak, now 78.
Arab Responsibility Deleted
The Dispatch cuts out critical background information which points to an Arab role for the divided nature of the city.
Israel offered citizenship to Palestinians in East Jerusalem after the war, but few accepted. The rest were given the status of Jerusalem residents who can work in Israel and must pay Israeli taxes. They also can run and vote in municipal elections, and their numbers would give them significant clout. But they have largely boycotted city politics. [CAMERA notes: In other words, if they exercised their right for representation, they would have a more significant say in the matters that concern them, such as funding and services. The demographically similar ultra-Orthodox population, much of which also does not recognize the idea of a sovereign Jewish state, nevertheless acknowledges the pragmatic advantage to be had by participating in local politics, and therefore enjoys the benefits.]
“If we accept to have elections in East Jerusalem under the umbrella of Israeli law, it means that we recognize the legitimacy of the annexation,” said Ziad Abu Zayyad, a former Palestinian Cabinet minister who edits a journal on Israeli-Palestinian affairs.
In the 1990s, interim peace accords enshrined Palestinian demands that residents of Jerusalem be allowed to vote and run in elections for the Palestinian Authority. That helped reinforce a non-Israeli identity.
“We failed to bring the Arabs to the idea that they are part of Jerusalem,” said Rivlin, the lawmaker. “And when we let them vote for the Palestinians election, we let them declare that they are not part of Israel.”
The severe violence of the second intifada, which erupted in 2000, made the chasm seem unbridgeable.
Vanunu said she favored a more conciliatory line toward Arabs, but she wondered when she would feel comfortable strolling in the Old City again. Last time, on the Yom Kippur holiday four years ago, “I went trembling,” she said.
“These days, I hear more and more voices saying they don’t want us here, that they want to throw us into the sea, she said. “It is when I stop hearing these voices that I may go to East Jerusalem again.”
This passage highlights the Arab refusal to take part in their own municipal government, compounded with Arab violence against and hostility towards Jews, both significant factors contributing to the city’s de facto division.
Conclusion
To be sure, passages and sentences from the original Los Angeles Times feature that reinforce the Arab notion Israel is a brutal occupier of the oppressed Arab residents are also deleted. Nevertheless, that view, as expressed by Ibrahim Dabbak, Kamil and Suad Saou, Moaz Zatari, Mahmoud and Fatima abu Hawa, and aided by Moshe Amirav, is the overwhelming narrative of the Dispatch’s version.
As Dabbak observes about Israel’s victory in 1967, “We were talking two completely different languages. They were thinking they were liberating the land, and we were thinking they were occupying the land.”
In the Dispatch’s lopsided editing of the Times story, only one side was allowed to do the talking. The other, represented by Madlene Vanunu and Hillel and Shlomit Mali, was completely muted.
by Tamar Sternthal
Possible Eruption of Violent Crisis in Lebanon After July 15
In the past few days, Arab and Iranian media reports have pointed to the possibility that Lebanon's current political crisis may become a violent conflict after July 15, 2007.
It should be noted that certain international events concerning Lebanon and Syria are expected in mid-July, specifically:
1. The U.N. Security Council session scheduled for July 16, 2007, which is to discuss a report by U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon on the progress in the implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701. This discussion will be devoted in part to the report submitted by a delegation sent by Ki-Moon to the Syria-Lebanon border to assess border supervision. According to the London daily Al-Hayat, the delegation's recommendations included the stationing of international experts in border control to aid Lebanon's security apparatuses in monitoring the Syria-Lebanon border. [1]
2. Between July 15 and 17, 2007, the submission of another report to the U.N. Security Council, by the head of the International Investigation Commission into the murder of former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Al-Hariri, Serge Brammertz.
The following are excerpts from these Arab and Iranian media reports:
Reports of Syria Instructing its Citizens to Leave Lebanon by July 15
On July 5, 2007, the Iranian news agency IRNA reported that Syrian authorities had instructed all Syrian citizens residing in Lebanon to return to their country by July 15, 2007. [2] The next day, the Israeli Arab daily Al-Sinara similarly reported, on the authority of a Lebanese source close to Damascus, that Syria was planning to remove its citizens from Lebanon. [3] Also on July 5, the Lebanese daily Al-Liwa reported rumors that Syrian workers were leaving Lebanon at the request of the Syrian authorities. [4] In addition, the Syrian government daily Al-Thawra reported that Syrian universities would accept Syrian students who were leaving Lebanon due to the instability there. [5]
These sources offered a number of explanations for Syria's calls for its citizens to leave Lebanon. IRNA tied these calls to Lebanese President Emil Lahoud's ultimatum to the Lebanese opposition to decide on how to deal with the crisis in Lebanon, and also claimed that the calls were connected to Syria's intention to mobilize reserve units in expectation of an attack on it by Israel. On the other hand, the Lebanese daily Al-Liwa tied Syria's calls to the upcoming additional report by the International Investigation Commission into the Al-Hariri assassination, which is expected next week.
The Lebanese Opposition: After Mid-July, We Will Establish a Second Government in Lebanon
For the past month, senior officials in the Hizbullah-led Lebanese government, as well as Lebanese President Emil Lahoud, have been threatening to establish a second government in Lebanon, or to take "historical" and "strategic" steps that will be announced in due course.
The crisis between the March 14 Forces and the Lebanese opposition has deepened with the approach of the legal date set for the presidential elections, which the opposition is threatening to prevent, and in light of harsh criticism by the Lebanese government and the March 14 Forces accusing Syria of being behind all the recent attempts to destabilize Lebanon.
On June 18, 2007, the Lebanese daily Al-Akhbar, which is close to the Lebanese opposition, reported that Lahoud had postponed until mid-July the deadline on his ultimatum requiring the opposition to apprise him of their plans against the March 14 Forces. According to the paper, if the crisis is not resolved by July 15, the opposition will form the second government. [6]
On June 25, 2007, Al-Akhbar reported that the opposition had already discussed plans to form a second government and to take over the government ministries, in the event that the Al-Siniora government continued to adhere to its current positions. The paper added that the opposition had even begun to name the individuals who will form the second government.
A senior member of the Lebanese opposition told Al-Akhbar that he believed that if the second government is established, the Lebanese army will adopt a neutral stance. He estimated that the regions that would be loyal to the second government would be larger than the ones remaining loyal to Al-Siniora's government. He further said that people from the South, from the Beqa' valley, and from a large part of the Mount Lebanon region, as well as in the North, would refuse to recognize Al-Siniora's government. He added that UNIFIL would find itself facing a new reality when it discovered that Al-Siniora's government was no longer able to support its activities or ensure its security. [7]
It should be noted that an article in the Lebanese daily Al-Mustaqbal, which is affiliated with the March 14 Forces, estimated that the second government's jurisdiction would include South Lebanon, that is, the area bordering Israel, and the Beqa' valley, that is, the region bordering Syria. [8]
Al-Mustaqbal Warns of Syrian-Iranian Plan for Coup in Lebanon
A series of op-eds in the Lebanese daily Al-Mustabal, by Nusair Al-As'ad, warned of a planned Syrian-Iranian coup in Lebanon. [9] According to these articles, Hizbullah was planning to launch, in the near future, a new stage in the coup being led by Syria and Iran in Lebanon, during which it would use its weapons on the domestic Lebanese front. The threats by the Lebanese opposition to establish a second government in Lebanon were part of this planned coup, and the coup was to be carried out under the banner of establishing a second government.
The articles stated that the threat voiced by Syrian President Bashar Assad during his April 2007 meeting with U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, namely, that the situation in Lebanon would "reach the point of civil war," was actually "an official declaration of the coup he is now staging in Lebanon."
Hizbullah Arms Itself in Preparation for the Next Stage; One of Its Military Targets May Be Beirut
According to the series of articles in Al-Mustaqbal, Hizbullah was continuing military preparations in a number of locations in Lebanon, as part of preparation for the next stage in the Lebanon coup. Hizbullah's weapons were for two main purposes: a) to be used in a conflict with Israel, to assist the Syrian regime in a war with Israel, or to assist Iran in a confrontation with the U.S.; and b) to be used for fighting in Beirut.
The articles said that Hizbullah's military preparations fell under several categories:
a) Military activity both south and north of the Litani River, in defiance of U.N. Resolution 1701;
b) Transformation of the Beqa' region into a military zone, so that it could be used as a war zone in Hizbullah's next confrontation with Israel and as a frontline in the next war. In this context, the articles mentioned several events: a recent military parade in the Beqa' valley, in which hundreds of Hizbullah activists participated; days-long truck traffic from the northern villages in the Beqa' towards a village where permanent military positions had been reinstated in several buildings; groups of young people who had gone to train in Iran; and earthworks in Balbeq for installing Hizbullah's private telephone communications network;
c) Hizbullah's training of activists from other organizations loyal to the Syrian regime.
Change in Iranian Policy: From Preventing Civil War in Lebanon to Adopting Syria's Position
One of the articles in Al-Mustaqbal asked whether Iran's involvement in the Lebanon coup was evidence of a change in Iranian policy, which had previously been that everything possible must be done to prevent Sunni-Shi'ite civil war in Lebanon. It read:
"The dossier of Iranian-Syrian relations, and Iran's relations with influential Arab countries, has passed entirely into the hands of Iranian Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mottaki, and Iranian National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani no longer has anything to do with this issue…"
According to the articles, the positions of Larijani - who had previously been in charge of this dossier as the personal envoy of Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei - had been more flexible, and he had represented the position that Iran's relations with Lebanon should not depend entirely on Syria. Further, Larijani had even expressed dissatisfaction with the actions of the Syrian regime, and at the fact that "Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad had closed off all horizons for a solution in Lebanon..."
The articles stated that "during his last visit to the Syrian capital, Mottaki heard from the leadership of the Syrian regime some sort of protest over the 'red line,' to which Iran had agreed in its negotiations with Saudi Arabia with respect to Lebanon [and] which was aimed at preventing civil war between Sunnis and Shi'ites in Lebanon… The fact that Mottaki has [now] been given the entire dossier begs the question: Does this development [mean] a return to the previous stage in the relations between Iran and Syria, that is, the stage at which Iran had to go through Damascus and back it [on the Lebanese issue]?"
The articles also stated: "A review of recent Iranian activities reveals that lately Iran has not refused any Syrian request… Does Iran's current backing of a coup in Lebanon [mean] that it has reneged on the January 2007 agreement with Saudi Arabia on the 'red line'… of [preventing] civil war in Lebanon?..."
[1] Al-Hayat (London) June 27, 2007. It should be noted that on July 2, 2007, Lebanon deployed about 300 soldiers from the internal security forces along the Syria-Lebanon border to assist the Lebanese army in supervising the border. Al-Mustaqbal (Lebanon) July 3, 2007.
[2] IRNA (Iran), July 5, 2007.
[3] Al-Sinara (Nazareth), July 6, 2007.
[4] Al-Liwa (Lebanon), July 5, 2007.
[5] Al-Thawra (Syria), July 5, 2007.
[6] Al-Akhbar (Lebanon), June 18, 2007, June 19, 2007.
[7] Al-Akhbar (Lebanon) June 25, 2007.
[8] Al-Mustaqbal (Lebanon), July 2, 2007.
[9] Al-Mustaqbal (Lebanon), June 30, 2007; July 2, 2007; July 3, 2007.
It should be noted that certain international events concerning Lebanon and Syria are expected in mid-July, specifically:
1. The U.N. Security Council session scheduled for July 16, 2007, which is to discuss a report by U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon on the progress in the implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701. This discussion will be devoted in part to the report submitted by a delegation sent by Ki-Moon to the Syria-Lebanon border to assess border supervision. According to the London daily Al-Hayat, the delegation's recommendations included the stationing of international experts in border control to aid Lebanon's security apparatuses in monitoring the Syria-Lebanon border. [1]
2. Between July 15 and 17, 2007, the submission of another report to the U.N. Security Council, by the head of the International Investigation Commission into the murder of former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Al-Hariri, Serge Brammertz.
The following are excerpts from these Arab and Iranian media reports:
Reports of Syria Instructing its Citizens to Leave Lebanon by July 15
On July 5, 2007, the Iranian news agency IRNA reported that Syrian authorities had instructed all Syrian citizens residing in Lebanon to return to their country by July 15, 2007. [2] The next day, the Israeli Arab daily Al-Sinara similarly reported, on the authority of a Lebanese source close to Damascus, that Syria was planning to remove its citizens from Lebanon. [3] Also on July 5, the Lebanese daily Al-Liwa reported rumors that Syrian workers were leaving Lebanon at the request of the Syrian authorities. [4] In addition, the Syrian government daily Al-Thawra reported that Syrian universities would accept Syrian students who were leaving Lebanon due to the instability there. [5]
These sources offered a number of explanations for Syria's calls for its citizens to leave Lebanon. IRNA tied these calls to Lebanese President Emil Lahoud's ultimatum to the Lebanese opposition to decide on how to deal with the crisis in Lebanon, and also claimed that the calls were connected to Syria's intention to mobilize reserve units in expectation of an attack on it by Israel. On the other hand, the Lebanese daily Al-Liwa tied Syria's calls to the upcoming additional report by the International Investigation Commission into the Al-Hariri assassination, which is expected next week.
The Lebanese Opposition: After Mid-July, We Will Establish a Second Government in Lebanon
For the past month, senior officials in the Hizbullah-led Lebanese government, as well as Lebanese President Emil Lahoud, have been threatening to establish a second government in Lebanon, or to take "historical" and "strategic" steps that will be announced in due course.
The crisis between the March 14 Forces and the Lebanese opposition has deepened with the approach of the legal date set for the presidential elections, which the opposition is threatening to prevent, and in light of harsh criticism by the Lebanese government and the March 14 Forces accusing Syria of being behind all the recent attempts to destabilize Lebanon.
On June 18, 2007, the Lebanese daily Al-Akhbar, which is close to the Lebanese opposition, reported that Lahoud had postponed until mid-July the deadline on his ultimatum requiring the opposition to apprise him of their plans against the March 14 Forces. According to the paper, if the crisis is not resolved by July 15, the opposition will form the second government. [6]
On June 25, 2007, Al-Akhbar reported that the opposition had already discussed plans to form a second government and to take over the government ministries, in the event that the Al-Siniora government continued to adhere to its current positions. The paper added that the opposition had even begun to name the individuals who will form the second government.
A senior member of the Lebanese opposition told Al-Akhbar that he believed that if the second government is established, the Lebanese army will adopt a neutral stance. He estimated that the regions that would be loyal to the second government would be larger than the ones remaining loyal to Al-Siniora's government. He further said that people from the South, from the Beqa' valley, and from a large part of the Mount Lebanon region, as well as in the North, would refuse to recognize Al-Siniora's government. He added that UNIFIL would find itself facing a new reality when it discovered that Al-Siniora's government was no longer able to support its activities or ensure its security. [7]
It should be noted that an article in the Lebanese daily Al-Mustaqbal, which is affiliated with the March 14 Forces, estimated that the second government's jurisdiction would include South Lebanon, that is, the area bordering Israel, and the Beqa' valley, that is, the region bordering Syria. [8]
Al-Mustaqbal Warns of Syrian-Iranian Plan for Coup in Lebanon
A series of op-eds in the Lebanese daily Al-Mustabal, by Nusair Al-As'ad, warned of a planned Syrian-Iranian coup in Lebanon. [9] According to these articles, Hizbullah was planning to launch, in the near future, a new stage in the coup being led by Syria and Iran in Lebanon, during which it would use its weapons on the domestic Lebanese front. The threats by the Lebanese opposition to establish a second government in Lebanon were part of this planned coup, and the coup was to be carried out under the banner of establishing a second government.
The articles stated that the threat voiced by Syrian President Bashar Assad during his April 2007 meeting with U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, namely, that the situation in Lebanon would "reach the point of civil war," was actually "an official declaration of the coup he is now staging in Lebanon."
Hizbullah Arms Itself in Preparation for the Next Stage; One of Its Military Targets May Be Beirut
According to the series of articles in Al-Mustaqbal, Hizbullah was continuing military preparations in a number of locations in Lebanon, as part of preparation for the next stage in the Lebanon coup. Hizbullah's weapons were for two main purposes: a) to be used in a conflict with Israel, to assist the Syrian regime in a war with Israel, or to assist Iran in a confrontation with the U.S.; and b) to be used for fighting in Beirut.
The articles said that Hizbullah's military preparations fell under several categories:
a) Military activity both south and north of the Litani River, in defiance of U.N. Resolution 1701;
b) Transformation of the Beqa' region into a military zone, so that it could be used as a war zone in Hizbullah's next confrontation with Israel and as a frontline in the next war. In this context, the articles mentioned several events: a recent military parade in the Beqa' valley, in which hundreds of Hizbullah activists participated; days-long truck traffic from the northern villages in the Beqa' towards a village where permanent military positions had been reinstated in several buildings; groups of young people who had gone to train in Iran; and earthworks in Balbeq for installing Hizbullah's private telephone communications network;
c) Hizbullah's training of activists from other organizations loyal to the Syrian regime.
Change in Iranian Policy: From Preventing Civil War in Lebanon to Adopting Syria's Position
One of the articles in Al-Mustaqbal asked whether Iran's involvement in the Lebanon coup was evidence of a change in Iranian policy, which had previously been that everything possible must be done to prevent Sunni-Shi'ite civil war in Lebanon. It read:
"The dossier of Iranian-Syrian relations, and Iran's relations with influential Arab countries, has passed entirely into the hands of Iranian Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mottaki, and Iranian National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani no longer has anything to do with this issue…"
According to the articles, the positions of Larijani - who had previously been in charge of this dossier as the personal envoy of Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei - had been more flexible, and he had represented the position that Iran's relations with Lebanon should not depend entirely on Syria. Further, Larijani had even expressed dissatisfaction with the actions of the Syrian regime, and at the fact that "Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad had closed off all horizons for a solution in Lebanon..."
The articles stated that "during his last visit to the Syrian capital, Mottaki heard from the leadership of the Syrian regime some sort of protest over the 'red line,' to which Iran had agreed in its negotiations with Saudi Arabia with respect to Lebanon [and] which was aimed at preventing civil war between Sunnis and Shi'ites in Lebanon… The fact that Mottaki has [now] been given the entire dossier begs the question: Does this development [mean] a return to the previous stage in the relations between Iran and Syria, that is, the stage at which Iran had to go through Damascus and back it [on the Lebanese issue]?"
The articles also stated: "A review of recent Iranian activities reveals that lately Iran has not refused any Syrian request… Does Iran's current backing of a coup in Lebanon [mean] that it has reneged on the January 2007 agreement with Saudi Arabia on the 'red line'… of [preventing] civil war in Lebanon?..."
[1] Al-Hayat (London) June 27, 2007. It should be noted that on July 2, 2007, Lebanon deployed about 300 soldiers from the internal security forces along the Syria-Lebanon border to assist the Lebanese army in supervising the border. Al-Mustaqbal (Lebanon) July 3, 2007.
[2] IRNA (Iran), July 5, 2007.
[3] Al-Sinara (Nazareth), July 6, 2007.
[4] Al-Liwa (Lebanon), July 5, 2007.
[5] Al-Thawra (Syria), July 5, 2007.
[6] Al-Akhbar (Lebanon), June 18, 2007, June 19, 2007.
[7] Al-Akhbar (Lebanon) June 25, 2007.
[8] Al-Mustaqbal (Lebanon), July 2, 2007.
[9] Al-Mustaqbal (Lebanon), June 30, 2007; July 2, 2007; July 3, 2007.
Monday, July 02, 2007
Kosovo, Serbie : l’OTAN s’est trompé d’ennemi
« Nous [l’OTAN] avons bombardé le mauvais côté [au Kosovo et en Serbie en 1999].
Les écrans de nos télévisions débordaient d’images d’Albanais du Kosovo fuyant à travers les frontières pour aller chercher refuge en Macédoine et en Albanie.
Des rapports alarmistes disaient que les forces de sécurité de Slobodan Milosevic menaient une campagne génocidaire, et qu’au moins 100 000 Albanais du Kosovo avaient été massacrés et enterrés dans des charniers à travers toute la province.
L’OTAN entra promptement en action, bien qu’aucun des États membres de cette alliance n’ait été menacé, et se mit à bombarder non seulement le Kosovo, mais aussi les infrastructures et la population de la Serbie elle-même, sans que cette action soit autorisée par une résolution des Nations Unies.
On qualifia de « Munichois » ceux d’entre nous qui mirent en garde l’Occident contre le fait qu’il se laissait entraîner aux côtés d’un mouvement indépendantiste albanais extrémiste et partisan.
On oublia opportunément que l’organisation qui menait le combat pour l’indépendance, l’Armée de libération du Kosovo (UCK), était désignée universellement comme organisation terroriste et connue pour être soutenue par Al Qaida.
Depuis l’intervention de l’OTAN et de l’ONU en 1999 au Kosovo, ce dernier est devenu la capitale européenne du crime.
Le commerce des esclaves sexuels y est florissant.
La province est devenue la plaque tournante de la drogue en direction de l’Europe et de l’Amérique du Nord.
Et pour comble, la plupart des drogues proviennent d’un autre pays « libéré » par l’Occident : l’Afghanistan. Les membres de l’UCK, qui a été démobilisée mais non démantelée, participent à la fois à ce trafic et au gouvernement.
La police de l’ONU arrête quelques-uns de ceux qui sont impliqués dans ce trafic et les traduit devant une juridiction passoire ouverte à la corruption et aux pressions.
Le but ultime des Albanais du Kosovo est de purger celui-ci de tous les non-Albanais, y compris les représentants de la communauté internationale, et de fusionner avec la mère-patrie albanaise, réalisant ainsi la « Grande Albanie ».
Leur campagne a commencé au début des années 1990, par l’attaque des forces de sécurité serbes ;
ils ont réussi à retourner la réaction musclée de Milosevic en une sympathie universelle pour leur cause.
Le génocide proclamé par l’Occident n’a jamais existé ; les 100 000 morts prétendument enterrés dans des charniers se sont avérés être environ 2 000, toutes ethnies confondues, y compris ceux qui sont tombés dans les combats.
Les Albanais du Kosovo ont joué sur nous comme sur un Stradivarius.
Nous avons financé et soutenu indirectement leur campagne pour l’indépendance d’un Kosovo ethniquement pur.
Nous ne leur avons jamais reproché d’être responsables des violences du début des années quatre-vingt-dix, et nous continuons de les dépeindre comme les victimes d’aujourd’hui, malgré les preuves du contraire.
Quand ils auront atteint leur objectif d’indépendance, aidés par les dollars de nos impôts ajoutés à ceux de Ben Laden et d’Al Qaida, on peut imaginer quel signal d’encouragement ce sera pour les autres mouvements indépendantistes du monde entier soutenus par le terrorisme !
Notre acharnement à creuser notre tombe n’est-il pas comique ?
Major Général Mackenzie
Ancien commandant (canadien)des forces occidentales en Bosnie
Les apprentissages monstrueux, ou la haine enseignée aux enfants
Des petites filles inquiètes qui récitent leur leçon de mort.
Des garçons confiés à des adultes si pervers qu'ils les incitent au suicide et au meurtre.
Des corps déchiquetés ou mutilés pour modèles. Le mépris de la vie en leçon.
Depuis des années et des années, des enfants sont élevés dans la haine.
Silence presque unanime sur ces violences.
Le viol des consciences n'est pas un abus reconnu.
Les organisations internationales ignorent-elles que la Convention relative aux Droits de l'Enfant concerne tous les enfants du monde ?
Les enfants palestiniens en seraient-ils moins dignes ?
Derrière la complaisance, le mépris absolu. Il n'est pas nouveau.
On le retrouve chez de nombreux militants en occident.
Qu'importent les réalités aux défenseurs d'une 'cause'.
Le sujet est tabou. Sacrifier des enfants en les abandonnant à la folie haineuse des leurs, prix accepté pour pouvoir continuer de brandir son petit drapeau.
Les déviants des droits de l'homme contre les droits de l'enfant.
Une femme et des hommes témoignent.
Ce sont des bénévoles 'venus aider' et qui découvrirent la propagande.
Ils témoignent, dans un document vidéo. Il a été traduit en français par Pistache.
Il est présentée sur le site de l'UPJF qui publie également la transcription des interventions :...
Quand les yeux se dessillent.
Des bénévoles, abusés par la propagande palestinienne, témoignent - Par Menahem Macina
« Parmi les témoignages-choc qui figurent dans la vidéo transcrite ci-après, on retiendra surtout celui de Daril Jones, « bénévole australienne, qui, trompée par la propagande palestinienne, était venue aider les Palestiniens, et comprit, par la suite, qu’ils étaient comme possédés d’un désir irrépressible de tuer, au point de détruire des vies d’enfants.
Elle raconte, avec larmes, que des Palestiniens montraient [aux humanitaires] des photos de corps "mutilés, démembrés, déchiquetés", et affirmaient que c’était le résultat de "tortures perpétrées par les Israéliens".
Plus tard, quand elle vit un enfant palestinien se faire exploser devant elle, elle réalisa que [l’état des] cadavres mis en pièces [qu’elle avait vus sur les photos] était le résultat des corps bardés d’explosifs, que les Palestiniens utilisaient comme des bombes humaines contre les Israéliens.
Daril Jones a figuré dans le film "The road to Jenin" [la route de Jénine]*, réalisé par le cinéaste français, Pierre Rehov » (Note de YouTube).
Le chagrin émouvant de cette bénévole est à la mesure de l’horreur que lui ont causée la découverte de la culture, quasi mythique, de la haine, qui anime tant de Palestiniens, et l’immense déception qui fut la sienne de découvrir que les dirigeants de ce peuple non seulement ne font rien pour endiguer cette haine morbide, mais la célèbrent au contraire et la proposent en modèle à la jeune génération palestinienne.
Il faut diffuser largement ce document, non pour inciter à la haine des Palestiniens, mais pour aider les politiques et tous les hommes et les femmes de bonne volonté du monde à comprendre à quel fléau est confronté le peuple israélien, et à faire pression sur les dirigeants politiques palestiniens pour qu’ils répudient cet état d’esprit mortel et éduquent leur peuple, et surtout leurs enfants, à la paix et à la cohabitation entre les deux peuples qui se partagent la même terre, puisque, de toute façon, l’un comme l’autre n’ont pas d’autre choix. »
* Refusé par les télévisions françaises. Alors qu'un autre film, 'jénine, Jénine' est diffusé sans réserve. Voir l'article d'Aaron Kein publié par DesInfos.
Des garçons confiés à des adultes si pervers qu'ils les incitent au suicide et au meurtre.
Des corps déchiquetés ou mutilés pour modèles. Le mépris de la vie en leçon.
Depuis des années et des années, des enfants sont élevés dans la haine.
Silence presque unanime sur ces violences.
Le viol des consciences n'est pas un abus reconnu.
Les organisations internationales ignorent-elles que la Convention relative aux Droits de l'Enfant concerne tous les enfants du monde ?
Les enfants palestiniens en seraient-ils moins dignes ?
Derrière la complaisance, le mépris absolu. Il n'est pas nouveau.
On le retrouve chez de nombreux militants en occident.
Qu'importent les réalités aux défenseurs d'une 'cause'.
Le sujet est tabou. Sacrifier des enfants en les abandonnant à la folie haineuse des leurs, prix accepté pour pouvoir continuer de brandir son petit drapeau.
Les déviants des droits de l'homme contre les droits de l'enfant.
Une femme et des hommes témoignent.
Ce sont des bénévoles 'venus aider' et qui découvrirent la propagande.
Ils témoignent, dans un document vidéo. Il a été traduit en français par Pistache.
Il est présentée sur le site de l'UPJF qui publie également la transcription des interventions :...
Quand les yeux se dessillent.
Des bénévoles, abusés par la propagande palestinienne, témoignent - Par Menahem Macina
« Parmi les témoignages-choc qui figurent dans la vidéo transcrite ci-après, on retiendra surtout celui de Daril Jones, « bénévole australienne, qui, trompée par la propagande palestinienne, était venue aider les Palestiniens, et comprit, par la suite, qu’ils étaient comme possédés d’un désir irrépressible de tuer, au point de détruire des vies d’enfants.
Elle raconte, avec larmes, que des Palestiniens montraient [aux humanitaires] des photos de corps "mutilés, démembrés, déchiquetés", et affirmaient que c’était le résultat de "tortures perpétrées par les Israéliens".
Plus tard, quand elle vit un enfant palestinien se faire exploser devant elle, elle réalisa que [l’état des] cadavres mis en pièces [qu’elle avait vus sur les photos] était le résultat des corps bardés d’explosifs, que les Palestiniens utilisaient comme des bombes humaines contre les Israéliens.
Daril Jones a figuré dans le film "The road to Jenin" [la route de Jénine]*, réalisé par le cinéaste français, Pierre Rehov » (Note de YouTube).
Le chagrin émouvant de cette bénévole est à la mesure de l’horreur que lui ont causée la découverte de la culture, quasi mythique, de la haine, qui anime tant de Palestiniens, et l’immense déception qui fut la sienne de découvrir que les dirigeants de ce peuple non seulement ne font rien pour endiguer cette haine morbide, mais la célèbrent au contraire et la proposent en modèle à la jeune génération palestinienne.
Il faut diffuser largement ce document, non pour inciter à la haine des Palestiniens, mais pour aider les politiques et tous les hommes et les femmes de bonne volonté du monde à comprendre à quel fléau est confronté le peuple israélien, et à faire pression sur les dirigeants politiques palestiniens pour qu’ils répudient cet état d’esprit mortel et éduquent leur peuple, et surtout leurs enfants, à la paix et à la cohabitation entre les deux peuples qui se partagent la même terre, puisque, de toute façon, l’un comme l’autre n’ont pas d’autre choix. »
* Refusé par les télévisions françaises. Alors qu'un autre film, 'jénine, Jénine' est diffusé sans réserve. Voir l'article d'Aaron Kein publié par DesInfos.
Monday, June 25, 2007
Musulman outragé : un métier d’avenir
Dans la série des “Fauxtography” dont Internet a fait ses choix gras l’an dernier (il a été démontré que beaucoup de photos ou de reportages sur les Palestiniens étaient consciencieusement truqués, fabriqués, mis en scène etc…), voici, après Green Helmet et la pleureuse professionnelle, la dernière star du moment. Son métier ? Musulman indigné.
Cliquez sur “lire la suite” ci-dessous pour voir quelques unes des réalisations de ce dernier top-model d’un nouveau genre. Vas-y, bouge coco…
Lire la suite »
Cliquez sur “lire la suite” ci-dessous pour voir quelques unes des réalisations de ce dernier top-model d’un nouveau genre. Vas-y, bouge coco…
Lire la suite »
Tuesday, June 19, 2007
Monday, June 18, 2007
Thursday, June 14, 2007
Gaza 2007
Although I could have written the cartoon as a satire, it is, in fact, true.
The "But we're not Jews" story was reported by the British newspaper,
the Telegraph. Quoting their Gaza reporter:
"'We're not Jews' the brother of Jamal Abu Jediyan, a Fatah commander, pleaded during a live telephone conversation with a Palestinian radio station.
Minutes later both men were dragged into the streets and riddled with bullets." -more
"'We're not Jews' the brother of Jamal Abu Jediyan, a Fatah commander, pleaded during a live telephone conversation with a Palestinian radio station.
Minutes later both men were dragged into the streets and riddled with bullets." -more
Meanwhile, the Arab descent into anti-Arab violence seems to be spreading across the region. As I write these words, news is coming in of an attack on a major Shi'ite site in Iraq.
Returning to Gaza, Human Rights Watch has accused Hamas and Fatah of war crimes against civilians in Gaza :
"Over the past three days 'both Fatah and Hamas military forces have summarily executed captives, killed people not involved in hostilities, and engaged in gun battles ... inside and near Palestinian hospitals,'
Among other atrocities, it cited the killing of Muhammad Swairki, 28, a cook for the guard of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas of Fatah. Mr Swairki was thrown to his death from a 15-storey building with his arms and legs bound.
Later Fatah forces captured Muhammad al-Ra'fati, a Hamas supporter, and executed him in the same way." -more
DEBKAfile’s military sources tie the new fighting in Gaza with the ongoing fighting in Lebanon between the Syrian-backed Fatah Al Islam and the Lebanese Army:
"Iran and Syria are the winners of Hamas’ military coup against Fatah in Gaza Strip" -more
And YNetNews claims that Fatah and Hamas are now preparing for a "huge conflict":
"Both Fatah and Hamas are preparing for an even larger confrontation in the coming hours, in a fight for control of various power centers in Gaza, sources from both factions told Ynet Tuesday night. Many of these are located near the office of Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas" -more.
All about welfare...
They believe they are oppressed because of their Islamic faith, but in reality it is the welfare state itself that has created this class of losers.
Gunnar Heinsohn
Illustration exemplaire du lien, évoqué par Heinsohn, entre l’Etat-providence et la création d’un excès de jeunes hommes comme facteurs d’explication dans l’essor de la violence et du terrorisme international, le cas du Monde arabe.
Qui, contrairement à ce qui est souvent dit, ne souffre pas tant de la pauvreté que du trop-plein de richesse qui a suivi le 1er choc pétrolier de 1973 et permis l’installation d’un Etat-providence ayant à son tour retardé la baisse de fécondité que connait le reste du monde.
Rente pétrolière qui, en subventionnant l’économie des ménages et en décourageant, via la Charia et l’islam, le travail extérieur des femmes et donc leur émancipation, favorisa ainsi la fécondité et l’arrivée de ce surplus de jeunes hommes frusrés à la fois par le manque de postes et leur manque de qualification.
Du moins jusqu’à ce que ledit Etat-providence soit remis en question par l’effondrement du prix du pétrole au milieu des années 80, faisant ainsi, avec l’insuffisance des revenus des ménages, l’augmentation (partielle) de l’activité des femmes et le recul de l’âge au mariage, retomber la fécondité.
D’où le constat particulièrement sévère (bien qu’établi par un groupe de chercheurs arabes) du rapport de l’ONU paru en 2002 sur le développement humain dans les pays arabes. Pointant les déficits à la fois selon les critères traditionnels (espérance de vie, alphabétisation des adultes, éducation et PIB par tête, montée du chômage, fuite des cerveaux et des capitaux), mais aussi, comme le rappelle Philippe Fargues, en “liberté civile et politique, production et diffusion du savoir, et émancipation des femmes” (sans parler de la qualité de l’enseignement, à visée plus théologique que professionnelle).
Exemples :
- 65 millions d’analphabètes (sur 280 millions), dont deux tiers de femmes
- plus de la moitié des femmes analphabètes
- 1,2% des foyers équipés d’ordinateurs personnel, 0,6% utilisent Internet
- traduction de 330 livres étrangers en arabe pour tous les pays arabes réunis, soit le cinquième des traductions en langue nationale que produit par exemple la Grèce
- traductions au cours des mille années écoulées équivalentes à ce que traduit l’Espagne en un an…
- le plus faible index de liberté au monde, plus faible même que celui de l’Afrique subsaharienne
- le plus bas niveau d’accès aux Technologies d’information et de communication, plus bas encore que l’Afrique subsaharienne.
- Recherche et Développement : 0.4% du PIB en 1996, contre 1.26% en 1995 à Cuba, 2.35% en 1994 en Israël et 2.9% au Japon
- PIB de tous les Etats arabes réunis: 531.2 milliards de dollars en 1999 - moins que celui d’un seul pays européen (Espagne : 595.5 milliards).
- Entre 1975 et 1998, le PIB réel dans le monde arabe est passé de 256.7 milliards en 1975 à 445.7 milliards de dollars en 1998, en prix constants
- croissance du revenu réel par tête d’habitant entre 1985 et 1998 : 0.5% par an
- un des taux de chômage les plus élevés des pays en voie de développement (moyenne de 15%)
- productivité du travail industriel en 1990 équivalente à celle de 1970, proche alors des niveaux européens et japonais …
- 51% de jeunes appartenant à la tranche d’âge supérieure ont exprimé leur désir d’émigrer dans d’autres pays, en raison de leur ” insatisfaction face aux conditions actuelles et aux perspectives d’avenir dans leurs pays d’origine ”
Wednesday, June 13, 2007
Reuters/désinformation
On nous montre chaque jour des images de la ville palestinienne ressemblant à une ruine, presque complètement détruite.
Chaque jour nous lisons les témoignages des bombardements aveugles de l’armée libanaise sur tout ce qui bouge ou pas.
Chaque jour nous lisons des témoignages de civils, vivants avec leurs morts qu’ils ne peuvent même pas évacuer…
Reuters écrit CA aujourd’hui :
Reuters - L’armée libanaise, soucieuse de limiter les pertes civiles, fait probablement preuve de retenue face aux miliciens islamistes du camp de Nahr al Bared mais son échec à venir rapidement à bout de ses adversaires a révélé sa faible expérience et son manque de matériel.
Sunday, June 10, 2007
Breve...
‘’le bouton du compte à rebours pour la destruction du régime sioniste a été poussé.’’
président (führer) Ahmadinejad
président (führer) Ahmadinejad
Friday, June 08, 2007
Des dynamiques du gauchisme moderne
Theodore “Unabomber” Kaczynski
Pratiquement tout le monde s’accorde à reconnaître que nous vivons dans un monde chaotique. Une des manifestations les plus répandues de la folie de notre monde en est le « gauchisme »; une discussion sur le « gauchisme » peut servir d’introduction à une discussion des problèmes de la société moderne en général.Mais qu’est ce que le « gauchisme » ? Durant la première moitié du 20e siècle, le « gauchisme » pouvait grosso modo être identifié au socialisme. Aujourd’hui le mouvement est plus diffus, et il est plus difficile de discerner ce qu’est un « gauchiste ». Quand nous parlons de « gauchistes » dans ce texte, nous pensons principalement aux socialistes, collectivistes, adeptes du « politiquement correct », féministes, homosexuels, défenseurs des droits des animaux et ainsi de suite. Mais tous ceux qui sont affiliés à ces mouvements ne sont pas nécessairement des « gauchistes ». Nous allons essayer de montrer que le « gauchisme » n’est pas tant un mouvement ou une idéologie que la manifestation d’un type psychologique, ou plutôt de différents types. Ainsi, ce que nous appelons « gauchisme » apparaîtra plus clairement au cours de notre exposé sur la psychologie « gauchiste » .Même ainsi, notre conception du « gauchisme » apparaîtra bien moins claire que nous ne l’aurions souhaité, mais il ne semble pas qu’il puisse en être autrement. Tout ce que nous allons tenter de faire sera d’exposer en gros et approximativement les deux tendances psychologiques que nous croyons être les lignes de force principales du « gauchisme » moderne (…).Les deux tendances psychologiques qui sous tendent le « gauchisme » moderne sont le « sentiment d’infériorité » et la « sur-socialisation ».
Par « sentiment d’infériorité » nous ne pensons pas seulement au sentiment d’infériorité dans le sens strict du terme, mais à tout un faisceau de traits apparentés : faible estime de soi, sentiment de faiblesse, tendances dépressives, défaitisme, culpabilité, haine de soi, etc. Nous prétendons que les « gauchistes » modernes sont habités par ces sentiments (plus ou moins marqués) et que ces sentiments sont fondamentaux pour la détermination du « gauchisme » moderne.Quand quelqu’un prend comme une offense personnelle pratiquement tout ce qui peut être dit à propos de lui (ou des groupes auxquels il s’identifie), nous en concluons qu’il souffre d’un sentiment d’infériorité ou d’une faible estime de soi. Cette tendance est prononcée chez les défenseurs des droits des minorités, qu’ils appartiennent ou non aux dites minorités. Ils sont hypersensibles quant aux mots utilisés pour désigner ces minorités. Les termes « noir », « jaune », « handicapé » ou « nana » pour un africain, un asiatique, une personne souffrant de troubles invalidants, ou une femme n’ont pas à l’origine une connotation péjorative. « Gonzesse » et « nana » sont simplement les équivalents féminins de « mec », « type » ou « gars ». Les connotations péjoratives ont été attachées à ces termes par les activistes eux-mêmes. Certains défenseurs des animaux vont jusqu’à rejeter le vocable de pet pour celui d’« animal de compagnie ». Les anthropologues « gauchistes » font de grands efforts pour essayer de dissimuler ce qui pourrait être interprété comme négatif chez les peuplades primitives. Ils voudraient remplacer le terme « primitif » par « nonliterate » [qui ne sont pas parvenus au stade de l’écriture]. On arrive à une attitude paranoïaque envers tout ce qui pourrait suggérer qu’une culture primitive puisse être inférieure à la notre (nous ne voulons pas dire que les cultures primitives SONT inférieures à la notre ; nous voulons simplement montrer l’hypersensibilité des anthropologues « gauchistes »).Ceux qui sont le plus sensible au « politiquement correct » ne sont pas des habitants des ghettos noirs, ni des immigrants asiatiques, des femmes battues ou des handicapés, mais une minorité d’activistes, la plupart d’entre eux ne venant d’aucun des groupes « opprimés », mais bien plutôt des couches privilégiées de la société. La forteresse du « politiquement correct » abrite essentiellement des professeurs d’université, qui ont la sécurité de l’emploi avec de confortables salaires, et la majorité d’entre eux sont des blancs hétérosexuels de la classe moyenne.Beaucoup de « gauchistes » s’identifient avec les groupes qui ont une image d’êtres faibles (femmes), de vaincus (Amérindiens), de victimes d’ostracisme (homosexuels) ou de toute forme d’infériorité en général. Les « gauchistes » ont eux-mêmes le sentiment que ces groupes sont inférieurs. Ils ne se l’admettront jamais, mais c’est précisément parce qu’ils ressentent ces groupes comme inférieurs qu’ils s’identifient à leurs problèmes (nous ne voulons pas dire que les femmes, les indiens, etc., SONT inférieurs ; nous élucidons la psychologie « gauchiste » quant à ce point).Les « gauchistes » ont tendance à haïr tous ceux qui donnent une image de personnes fortes, bonnes et qui réussissent. Ils haïssent les USA, la civilisation occidentale, ils haïssent les hommes blancs, ils haïssent le rationalisme. Les raisons qu’invoquent les « gauchistes » pour haïr l’Occident, etc., ne correspondent évidemment pas avec leur motivations réelles. Ils DISENT qu’ils haïssent l’Occident car il est belligène, impérialiste, sexiste, ethnocentrique, et ainsi de suite, mais lorsque ces même tares apparaissent dans les pays socialistes ou dans les cultures primitives, les « gauchistes » leur trouvent des excuses, ou au mieux admettent A CONTRE CŒUR qu’elles existent ; alors qu’ils soulignent AVEC ENTHOUSIASME ces mêmes tares dans la civilisation occidentale. Ainsi, il est clair que ces tares ne sont pas le motif réel des « gauchistes » pour haïr les USA et l’Occident. Ils haïssent les USA et l’Occident parce qu’ils sont forts et puissants.Des termes tels que « confiance en soi », « initiative », « entreprise », « optimisme », etc., jouent peu de rôle dans le vocabulaire libéral [progressiste] et « gauchiste ». Le « gauchiste » est anti-individualiste, pro-collectiviste. Il veut que la société règle les problèmes de tout un chacun et prenne soin de lui. Il n’a a pas l’esprit d’une personne ayant une profonde confiance en elle-même, dans sa capacité à résoudre ses problèmes et à satisfaire ses besoins. Le « gauchiste » est opposé au concept de compétition car au fond de lui, il a une mentalité de perdant.Les philosophes « gauchistes » modernes ont tendance à repousser raison, science, réalité objective et à préférer le relativisme culturel(…). Ils sont profondément impliqués au niveau émotionnel dans leurs attaques contre la vérité et la réalité. Ils attaquent ces concepts en fonction de leurs besoins psychologiques. D’une part leur attaque canalise leur hostilité, et, pour autant qu’elle soit accomplie avec succès, elle satisfait le besoin de pouvoir. Plus important, les « gauchistes » haïssent les sciences et le rationalisme car ces derniers classifient certaines attitudes mentales comme bonnes (c.-à-d. : le succès, la supériorité) et d’autres comme mauvaises (c.-à-d. : l’échec, l’infériorité). Le sentiment d’infériorité du « gauchiste » est tel qu’il ne peut supporter cette classification entre supérieur et inférieur. Ceci sous-tend le rejet de nombreux « gauchistes » du concept de maladie mentale et de l’utilité des tests QI. Les « gauchistes » sont opposés aux thèses génétiques sur les capacités et comportements humains du fait que ces théories font apparaître certaines personnes comme supérieures et d’autres comme inférieures. Les « gauchistes » préfèrent laisser la responsabilité à la société de la capacité ou de l’incapacité d’un individu. Ainsi, si une personne est « inférieure », ce n’est pas de sa faute, mais celle de la société qui ne lui a pas permis de se réaliser.Typiquement, le « gauchiste » n’est pas le genre de personne dont le sentiment d’infériorité fera de lui un vantard, un égotiste, une brute, un mégalomane ou un compétiteur impitoyable. Ce genre de personnes n’ont pas tout à fait perdu confiance en elles-mêmes. Elles estiment mal leur propre valeur et leur pouvoir, mais ont encore la capacité de se concevoir comme fortes, et leurs efforts pour arriver à ce résultat explique leur comportement déplaisant. Mais le « gauchiste » est bien au-delà de tout cela. Son sentiment d’infériorité est tel qu’il lui est impossible de s’imaginer comme quelqu’un de fort et de valable. Ce qui explique le collectivisme du « gauchiste ». Il ne peut se sentir fort que comme membre d’une grande organisation ou d’un mouvement de masse avec lequel il puisse s’identifier.
Par « sentiment d’infériorité » nous ne pensons pas seulement au sentiment d’infériorité dans le sens strict du terme, mais à tout un faisceau de traits apparentés : faible estime de soi, sentiment de faiblesse, tendances dépressives, défaitisme, culpabilité, haine de soi, etc. Nous prétendons que les « gauchistes » modernes sont habités par ces sentiments (plus ou moins marqués) et que ces sentiments sont fondamentaux pour la détermination du « gauchisme » moderne.Quand quelqu’un prend comme une offense personnelle pratiquement tout ce qui peut être dit à propos de lui (ou des groupes auxquels il s’identifie), nous en concluons qu’il souffre d’un sentiment d’infériorité ou d’une faible estime de soi. Cette tendance est prononcée chez les défenseurs des droits des minorités, qu’ils appartiennent ou non aux dites minorités. Ils sont hypersensibles quant aux mots utilisés pour désigner ces minorités. Les termes « noir », « jaune », « handicapé » ou « nana » pour un africain, un asiatique, une personne souffrant de troubles invalidants, ou une femme n’ont pas à l’origine une connotation péjorative. « Gonzesse » et « nana » sont simplement les équivalents féminins de « mec », « type » ou « gars ». Les connotations péjoratives ont été attachées à ces termes par les activistes eux-mêmes. Certains défenseurs des animaux vont jusqu’à rejeter le vocable de pet pour celui d’« animal de compagnie ». Les anthropologues « gauchistes » font de grands efforts pour essayer de dissimuler ce qui pourrait être interprété comme négatif chez les peuplades primitives. Ils voudraient remplacer le terme « primitif » par « nonliterate » [qui ne sont pas parvenus au stade de l’écriture]. On arrive à une attitude paranoïaque envers tout ce qui pourrait suggérer qu’une culture primitive puisse être inférieure à la notre (nous ne voulons pas dire que les cultures primitives SONT inférieures à la notre ; nous voulons simplement montrer l’hypersensibilité des anthropologues « gauchistes »).Ceux qui sont le plus sensible au « politiquement correct » ne sont pas des habitants des ghettos noirs, ni des immigrants asiatiques, des femmes battues ou des handicapés, mais une minorité d’activistes, la plupart d’entre eux ne venant d’aucun des groupes « opprimés », mais bien plutôt des couches privilégiées de la société. La forteresse du « politiquement correct » abrite essentiellement des professeurs d’université, qui ont la sécurité de l’emploi avec de confortables salaires, et la majorité d’entre eux sont des blancs hétérosexuels de la classe moyenne.Beaucoup de « gauchistes » s’identifient avec les groupes qui ont une image d’êtres faibles (femmes), de vaincus (Amérindiens), de victimes d’ostracisme (homosexuels) ou de toute forme d’infériorité en général. Les « gauchistes » ont eux-mêmes le sentiment que ces groupes sont inférieurs. Ils ne se l’admettront jamais, mais c’est précisément parce qu’ils ressentent ces groupes comme inférieurs qu’ils s’identifient à leurs problèmes (nous ne voulons pas dire que les femmes, les indiens, etc., SONT inférieurs ; nous élucidons la psychologie « gauchiste » quant à ce point).Les « gauchistes » ont tendance à haïr tous ceux qui donnent une image de personnes fortes, bonnes et qui réussissent. Ils haïssent les USA, la civilisation occidentale, ils haïssent les hommes blancs, ils haïssent le rationalisme. Les raisons qu’invoquent les « gauchistes » pour haïr l’Occident, etc., ne correspondent évidemment pas avec leur motivations réelles. Ils DISENT qu’ils haïssent l’Occident car il est belligène, impérialiste, sexiste, ethnocentrique, et ainsi de suite, mais lorsque ces même tares apparaissent dans les pays socialistes ou dans les cultures primitives, les « gauchistes » leur trouvent des excuses, ou au mieux admettent A CONTRE CŒUR qu’elles existent ; alors qu’ils soulignent AVEC ENTHOUSIASME ces mêmes tares dans la civilisation occidentale. Ainsi, il est clair que ces tares ne sont pas le motif réel des « gauchistes » pour haïr les USA et l’Occident. Ils haïssent les USA et l’Occident parce qu’ils sont forts et puissants.Des termes tels que « confiance en soi », « initiative », « entreprise », « optimisme », etc., jouent peu de rôle dans le vocabulaire libéral [progressiste] et « gauchiste ». Le « gauchiste » est anti-individualiste, pro-collectiviste. Il veut que la société règle les problèmes de tout un chacun et prenne soin de lui. Il n’a a pas l’esprit d’une personne ayant une profonde confiance en elle-même, dans sa capacité à résoudre ses problèmes et à satisfaire ses besoins. Le « gauchiste » est opposé au concept de compétition car au fond de lui, il a une mentalité de perdant.Les philosophes « gauchistes » modernes ont tendance à repousser raison, science, réalité objective et à préférer le relativisme culturel(…). Ils sont profondément impliqués au niveau émotionnel dans leurs attaques contre la vérité et la réalité. Ils attaquent ces concepts en fonction de leurs besoins psychologiques. D’une part leur attaque canalise leur hostilité, et, pour autant qu’elle soit accomplie avec succès, elle satisfait le besoin de pouvoir. Plus important, les « gauchistes » haïssent les sciences et le rationalisme car ces derniers classifient certaines attitudes mentales comme bonnes (c.-à-d. : le succès, la supériorité) et d’autres comme mauvaises (c.-à-d. : l’échec, l’infériorité). Le sentiment d’infériorité du « gauchiste » est tel qu’il ne peut supporter cette classification entre supérieur et inférieur. Ceci sous-tend le rejet de nombreux « gauchistes » du concept de maladie mentale et de l’utilité des tests QI. Les « gauchistes » sont opposés aux thèses génétiques sur les capacités et comportements humains du fait que ces théories font apparaître certaines personnes comme supérieures et d’autres comme inférieures. Les « gauchistes » préfèrent laisser la responsabilité à la société de la capacité ou de l’incapacité d’un individu. Ainsi, si une personne est « inférieure », ce n’est pas de sa faute, mais celle de la société qui ne lui a pas permis de se réaliser.Typiquement, le « gauchiste » n’est pas le genre de personne dont le sentiment d’infériorité fera de lui un vantard, un égotiste, une brute, un mégalomane ou un compétiteur impitoyable. Ce genre de personnes n’ont pas tout à fait perdu confiance en elles-mêmes. Elles estiment mal leur propre valeur et leur pouvoir, mais ont encore la capacité de se concevoir comme fortes, et leurs efforts pour arriver à ce résultat explique leur comportement déplaisant. Mais le « gauchiste » est bien au-delà de tout cela. Son sentiment d’infériorité est tel qu’il lui est impossible de s’imaginer comme quelqu’un de fort et de valable. Ce qui explique le collectivisme du « gauchiste ». Il ne peut se sentir fort que comme membre d’une grande organisation ou d’un mouvement de masse avec lequel il puisse s’identifier.
Un peu de miel pique sur ILYS
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